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1. Introduction 
In this note we re-examine the “pass-through” relationship between the 
European Central Bank (ECB) policy rate and the standard mortgage variable rate 
(SVR) charged by Irish credit institutions. The issue, which was examined in some 
detail by Goggin et al. (2012), has attracted renewed interest in recent times 
owing to the continued observed difference between the SVR and the rate of 
interest charged on other variable rate mortgages in the Irish market. 
 
The Irish mortgage market consists of loans issued at both fixed and variable 
rates of interest. However, the latter form of finance dominates with over 85 per 
cent of loans issued at variable rates.  
 
There are two types of variable rates: “Tracker” mortgages, which were 
particularly popular during the boom period, are linked contractually to the ECB 
policy rate. Therefore, when the ECB rate changes, the tracker rate changes 
automatically. SVRs (which are variable rates other than trackers) are not 
specifically linked to an underlying market or wholesale rate. The lender may 
change this rate at their discretion.  
 
Consequently, with so many mortgages financed with either tracker or standard 
variable rates, particularly when compared with other European countries, the 
Irish mortgage book is more vulnerable to changes in the policy rate.  
 
However, the relationship between the policy, tracker and standard variable rate 
has been complicated considerably by the aftermath of the financial crisis. The 
relatively large presence of tracker mortgages on the balance sheets of some Irish 
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financial institutions has had significant implications for the profitability of these 
banks. As the cost of funding these mortgages increased substantially after the 
financial crisis, these products were no longer offered to prospective customers.  
 
The emergence of the wedge between the policy rate and the SVR comes in the 
context of the response of the monetary authorities to the financial crisis; in 
September of 2014, for example, the ECB announced the lowering of its main 
refinancing rate to a historic low of 0.05 per cent. In Figure 1 we plot the actual 
ECB policy rate and the average SVR for the Irish mortgage market over the 
period 2005 to 2014. The change in the relationship between the two rates is 
evident from 2009 onwards. 
 
Goggin et al. (2012) assess the “pass-through” relationship between the ECB 
policy rate and SVRs for a number of leading Irish domestic institutions over the 
period 1999 to 2011 and find clear evidence of a “break” in the relationship at the 
end of 2008. Namely, in the lead up to the financial crisis, a close relationship 
existed between the policy rate and the variable rate. However, thereafter, this 
relationship appeared to weaken considerably.  
 
Goggin et al. (2012) also posit reasons for the increasing wedge observed. They 
argue, in the main, profitability considerations are the key reason for distortions 
in the pass-through relationship. Relevant factors, in that regard, are funding 
costs, the degree of competition in the retail market and the degree of mortgage 
arrears on the balance sheets of Irish institutions.  
 
From a competition perspective, if there were enough competitors in the market 
one might expect margins to be competed down to some extent.  But if there is 
no entry and no effective competition, lenders are in a tight oligopoly.  This is 
likely to reduce the extent of pass-through, and has been shown to do so by 
international authors (Van Leuvensteijn et al., 2013).  The fall-out from the 
financial crisis has made the possibility of households switching from one 
mortgage provider to another more difficult for those with existing mortgages. It 
has also reduced the number of institutions active in the market and made entry 
more difficult as there are few housing transactions requiring new loans.   
 
In the more recent period, the size of the wedge between the SVR and the policy 
rate appears to be also influenced by the amount of impaired mortgage loans 
carried by an individual bank. Therefore, it would appear that the most effective 
way to repair the monetary transmission mechanism in the domestic market is to 
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improve competition in the domestic banking sector, while also addressing the 
structural issues which are still afflicting the balance sheets of Irish credit 
institutions. 
 
In this paper, in light of the increased attention devoted to this issue recently, we 
update some of the empirical work conducted in Goggin et al. (2012). Their 
sample period covered the period 1999-2011; however over the past number of 
years, it is likely that many of the trends which emerged immediately post-2008, 
have, if anything been exacerbated. Therefore, we think there is significant merit 
in revisiting this issue with data up to the end of 2014. We also discuss some of 
the conclusions of Goggin et al. (2012) in terms of the relevant policy implications 
which arise.  
 
The rest of the note is structured as follows; in the next section we update 
previous estimates of the pass-through of the ECB policy rate to the Irish market, 
we then discuss the policy implications of the reasons proposed by Goggin et al. 
(2012) as determinants of the wedge between the policy rate and the SVR. A final 
section offers some concluding comments. 
 
2. Modelling Framework 
For customers with tracker interest rates in the Irish market, the change in 
mortgage servicing costs of an increase in the ECB policy rate is easily assessed. 
Owing to the contractual link between tracker rates and the ECB rate, these rates 
are automatically affected by changes in the official rate. Thus a tracker rate, 
typically, would be the policy rate plus a fixed margin of, say, 100 basis points 
above the policy rate. SVRs, on the other hand, are set with no specific link to an 
underlying market or wholesale rate and the lender in question can choose to 
increase or decrease the rate at its discretion. 
 
We revisit the empirical application in Goggin et al. (2012) and re-estimate the 
following pass-through panel data model using quarterly observations over the 
period 1999 to 2014. The panel model, which follows the marginal cost pricing 
model outlined by Rousseas (1985) specifies retail lending rates as a function of 
the cost of funds and a mark-up, which is typically referred to as the interest rate 
spread. 
 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 +  𝛼1+𝑖� 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖5
𝑖=1
+  𝛼7+𝑖� 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖5
𝑖=1
 ∗  𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 
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𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 is institution i's standard variable rate, 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖 is the ECB policy rate and 
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖 is the institution-specific fixed effect. Note we also include an interaction 
term between the institution-specific dummy and the policy rate to examine 
whether the degree of pass-through varies across the different institutions. The 
model is now estimated over the period 1999 to 2014. 
 
Following Goggin et al. (2012) we initially conduct two estimations: one for the 
entire period and a second for the sub-sample period 1999 Q1 to 2008 Q4. The 
results are in Tables 1 and 2. From the table it can be observed that the 
coefficient on the policy variable (0.05) suggests that the policy variable has a 
relatively small influence on the SVR of individual institutions. We find that there 
are individual bank-specific effects as the dummies for the banks are all 
significant. However, there does not appear to be any significant difference 
across the institutions in terms of the pass-through effect irrespective of the two 
different sample periods; the coefficients on the interactive dummies between 
the banks and policy rates are all insignificant. 
 
In Table 2, we repeat the same estimation except this time for the sub-period 
1999 Q1 to 2008 Q4. There is a sizeable difference in the pass-through rate with 
the coefficient on the policy variable now 0.57. The model also fits the data much 
better with a significantly higher 𝑆2����. Clearly a sizeable change has occurred in the 
pass-through rate over the two periods.  
 
Similarly, if we compare the estimates in Table 1, with estimates of the pass-
through rate for the sub-period 1999 Q1-2012 Q4 estimated in Goggin et al. 
(2012) (Table 3), we see that the pass-through rate has also declined over the 
past three years; the coefficient on the policy variable for this period is 0.184.  
 
3. Reasons for the Wedge? 
In general over the entire sample period 1999-2011, Goggin et al. (2012) find a 
number of factors impacting the pass-through relationship between the ECB 
policy rate and the SVR. They find strong evidence to support competition effects; 
the lower the level of competition in the market, the higher the mortgage 
interest rate. For example, the introduction of Bank of Scotland had a significant 
impact on the residential mortgage market in 1999, when, following the banks 
entry into the Irish market, mortgage rates were reduced by up to 100 basis 
points.  
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Post-2008, one of the main factors cited for the breakdown in the pass-through 
relationship is the importance of crisis-related measures of funding costs such as 
the Eligible Liabilities Guarantee (ELG) fee and Eonia spreads. The ELG, introduced 
in December 2009, provided a guarantee by the Irish State for certain liabilities of 
a number of credit institutions. As such it was one of a number of measures 
introduced in the aftermath of the financial crisis to generate confidence and 
stability in the Irish financial sector.2 The Eonia spread captures financial market 
uncertainty and risk, which increases funding costs for banks. Both the ELG and 
the Eonia spread increased funding costs over and above the policy rate. 
 
Furthermore, Goggin et al. (2012) contend that costs associated with increased 
credit risk were an increasingly important factor in setting variable rates post-
2008. Credit institutions with higher rates of mortgage arrears tend to exhibit 
higher variable rates. This suggests that some lenders are charging higher variable 
rates to compensate for the losses being incurred due to the presence of tracker 
loans. Goggin et al. (2012) also find evidence to suggest that banks which have 
higher shares of tracker loans on their books have higher rates. 
 
Ongoing balance sheet difficulties, however, are neither necessary nor sufficient 
for persistent high lending margins.  In a competitive market, loans that become 
“impaired” would be marked to market and these losses would be realised.  If 
they weren’t, financial institutions from outside the market would enter and 
“cherry pick” the good quality loans until the incumbent institutions either failed 
or altered their standard variable rates. 
 
Overall, these results suggest that the most effective way for the continuing 
wedge between the different mortgage variable interest rates to be remedied is 
for a more efficient resolution of the mortgage arrears issue and greater 
competition within the domestic banking sector. 
 
These results find significant resonance in the international literature. For 
example, in assessing interest rate setting across different countries, Pautkuri 
(2010), Cecchin (2011), Gambacorta (2004), De Graeve et al. (2007) and Van 
Leuvensteijn et al. (2013) include factors such as banks’ costs, competition, risk, 
capital, structural breaks, non-linearities (menu costs and switching costs) and 
asymmetric adjustment. To varying degrees, they find a role for all of these 
factors in explaining the pass-through relationship. Most of these papers use 
panel data and find that the pass-through relationship can vary considerably 
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across institutions, even after including a range of institution-specific controls. 
Raknerud et al. (2011) use a dynamic factor model to analyse the effect of banks’ 
funding costs on retail rates in Norway. The results point to incomplete pass-
through and that, when market funding costs increase, banks’ net interest 
margins decrease. However, there is considerable heterogeneity between 
institutions, with those that have a large share of market financing more 
vulnerable to increases in the market rate. Finally, short-term deposits and 
lending have been shown to exhibit quicker and more complete pass-through 
than longer-term ones (e.g. De Bondt, 2005). 
 
4. Concluding Comments 
The persistence of the relationship between the ECB policy rate and key interest 
rates in the Irish mortgage market highlights the extent to which the domestic 
economy is still suffering the after-effects of the financial crisis of 2007-2008. 
 
The results presented here, along with earlier analysis of this issue, indicate that 
the wedge between the policy rate and the SVR owes much to the weak levels of 
competition currently within the Irish financial sector. Furthermore, the 
continuing and growing nature of this wedge underscores the need for domestic 
credit institutions, currently in the market, to accelerate the speed at which 
impaired balance sheets are being repaired. 
 
Since 2012, it would appear that the non-standard monetary policy measures of 
the ECB have had no discernible impact on repairing the transmission 
mechanism; in that regard, it will be interesting to see if the recent adoption of 
quantitative easing by the ECB will lead to any improvement in the pass-through 
relationship. 
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TABLE 1  Results from Updated Panel Data Model: Q1 1999 – Q4 2014  
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error P-Value 
POL 0.05 0.02 0.07 
Bank 1 1.35 0.03 0.00 
Bank 2 1.40 0.03 0.00 
Bank 3 1.42 0.03 0.00 
Bank 4 1.43 0.03 0.00 
Bank 5 1.46 0.03 0.00 
Bank 1 * POL 0.01 0.03 0.76 
Bank 2 * POL 0.02 0.03 0.50 
Bank 3 * POL 0.00 0.03 0.94 
Bank 5 * POL 0.02 0.03 0.65 
 
𝑹𝟐���� 
0.08 
Number of Observations 320 
 
Source:  Authors’ own estimates. 
 
 
 
TABLE 2  Results from Updated Panel Data Model: Q1 1999 – Q4 2008  
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error P-Value 
POL 0.57 0.04 0.0 
Bank 1 0.78 0.05 0.0 
Bank 2 0.88 0.05 0.0 
Bank 3 0.72 0.05 0.0 
Bank 4 0.85 0.05 0.0 
Bank 5 0.82 0.05 0.0 
Bank 1 * POL 0.00 0.06 0.9 
Bank 2 * POL -0.03 0.06 0.6 
Bank 3 * POL 0.08 0.06 0.2 
Bank 5 * POL 0.03 0.06 0.6 
 
𝑹𝟐���� 
0.84 
Number of Observations 200 
 
Source:  Authors’ own estimates. 
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TABLE 3  Results from Updated Panel Data Model: 1999 Q1 – 2012 Q4 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error P-Value 
POL 0.18 0.03 0.00 
Bank 1 1.21 0.04 0.00 
Bank 2 1.26 0.04 0.00 
Bank 3 1.31 0.04 0.00 
Bank 4 1.29 0.04 0.00 
Bank 5 1.38 0.04 0.00 
Bank 1 * POL 0.01 0.05 0.83 
Bank 2 * POL 0.03 0.05 0.58 
Bank 3 * POL -0.03 0.05 0.51 
Bank 5 * POL -0.04 0.05 0.39 
 
𝑹𝟐���� 
0.33 
Number of Observations 280 
 
Source:  Authors’ own estimates. 
 
 
FIGURE 1 European Central Bank (ECB) Main Refinancing Rate and the Variable Rate (%) Charged in the Irish 
Mortgage Market: 2005 Q1 - 2015 Q1
 
 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland. 
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